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What culture must be recognised in the politics of 
multiculturalism? 
Nicolas Sanchez Dura 
Liberalism offers a very broad range of responses and theoretical constructions 
when it comes to addressing the issue of the cultural diversity of societies and 
their cultural management. Compare the responses of Charles Taylor, Clifford 
Geertz and Michael lgnatieff, to name three important thinkers. They all claim to 
defend liberalism, but their viewpoints are very different. Many other examples 
might be given, but I have chosen these three because they come from three 
different disciplinary fields: philosophy, empirical anthropology and political 
theory. My reason for choosing them is to show that their differences do not 
derive only from their different political sensibilities, from the position they 
adopt within the broad spectrum of liberalism, but also from theoretical options, 
one of which - and it is by no means the least important - is their concept of 
culture. In other words, how they imagine the function and dynamics of culture 
as a social whole, how they conceive the relations between the concept of culture 
and the concept of the nation, and also their conceptualisation of personal iden-
tity in relation to cultural identity. · 
I shall concentrate my comments on Charles Taylor because his book Multi-
culturalism and "The Politics of Recognition"' largely determines the subse-
quent debate. Taylor sets out from the assumption that our group and our per-
sonal identity - with the stress firmly placed on the former because, as he sees it, 
the latter depends on it - is moulded by the recognition, non-recognition or rnis-
recognition of us by others, with the result that rnisrecognition, or a complete 
absence of recognition, causes genuine harm because it wounds self-esteem, 
causes self-hatred and is therefore a form of oppression. Thus, recognition is a 
vital human need. For Taylor, however, this need has a historical genesis; it is 
not atemporal but the result of profound historical and cultural transformations 
that affect the shaping of a kind of subjectivity, of subjects' understanding of 
themselves, which is truly modem. The key concepts for understanding this 
change are those of dignity, authenticity, originality and dialogue. However, for 
Taylor, C. Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition" Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton University Press, 1992. 
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the purposes of addressing the aspect that I have indicated, I am especially inter-
ested in the two suppositions of authenticity and originality, as these are the ones 
that particularly involve the concept of culture. 
The modem concept of dignity contrasts with the ancien regime concept of 
"honour". Characteristically, honour is based on a system of privileges, distinc-
tions and exclusions which make subjects unequal by virtue of the inherited 
position that they occupy in a strongly stratified, hierarchical society. The repub-
lican state, however, replaced honour with the recognition of the fact that all 
citizens are of equal dignity. Thus it is a universal recognition of human dignity 
which can be discerned, via the Enlightenment and Kant, in the ability shared by 
all to direct their lives according to principles established independently by rea-
son. However, this egalitarian recognition was intensified and acquired new 
meaning as a result of another factor that flourished at the dawning of modernity, 
the emergence of an individualised identity that each person discovers inside 
himself. Hence the modem ideal of being true to oneself, and the fact that this 
individualised identity is linked to the ideal of authenticity, an authenticity 
whose device is the subject's self-knowledge of a kind of interiority, a consulta-
tion with oneself to discern one's moral feelings and one's constitutive peculiar-
ity. 
However, this ideal of authenticity was reworked with another concept that 
did not come from the Enlightenment tradition, but from the German Romantic 
tradition, particularly from Herder: each individual has his own original way of 
being human. Thus the ideal of authenticity is now complicated by that of origi-
nality. Consequently, being true to myself, being authentic, means being true to 
an originality of mine that only I can discover. But there is something else of 
extraordinary importance here. Herder applied his concept of originality not only 
to individuals as persons, but also to nations as individuals. And, like people, a 
nation or Volk had to be true to itself, to its own culture (which at that point 
meant that Germans could not be sÉcondúlass=Frenchmen or quasi-Frenchmen, 
but had to know what it meant to be German and what the destiny of German 
culture was). 
In fact - although Taylor does not stress this in his book - one might add to 
this genealogy the notions of Esprit de la Nation, which originated with Montes-
quieu, and National Character, which Hume discussed in the same period in a 
short essay, Of National Characters (1748), which was also influential. In chap-
ter 4 of book XIX of The Spirit of Laws (1748), Montesquieu says that the Esprit 
de la Nation is formed by various factors: climate, religion, laws, maxims of 
government, precedents, mores (m<Eurs) and customs (manieres). Thus the spirit 
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of the nation is produced by the interaction of physical and moral (social) causes. 
But Montesquieu's interest in this concept goes back to earlier stages of his 
work; in De la politique (1725), he affrrmed the existence of a soul or character 
of society - considering it the result of an infinite sequence of causes - which, 
once formed, tended to dominate society. Montesquieu thought of these factors 
as being closely interrelated, so that a variation in one of them might lead to the 
rest being affected. If the spirit of the nation was altered, there was a risk that the 
nation might lose its original qualities. In his Essai sur les causes (1736-1743) 
he says that, except in very primitive societies where natural causes are domi-
nant, moral causes are more important than physical causes. So that the devel-
opment of civilisation entailed the increasing influence ofreligion, customs, laws 
and the legislator had to exert an influence on moral causes, minimising physical 
ones (climate), though without damaging the balance through which the spirit of 
the nation was formed. It was Hume, in his essay Of National Characters ( 17 48), 
who gave definitive pre-eminence to moral causes. Hume also assumed that 
every nation had a set of characteristic customs that could be explained in rela-
tion to physical causes (climate) and moral causes (government, wealth, etc.). 
Montesquieu seems to have considered the primacy of the moral as opposed to 
the physical dimension on the basis of his correspondence with Hume. 
Now, the concepts of Esprit general de la nation and national character both 
imply at least a homogeneous, integrated, unitary conception of something that 
may be predicated of all members of a nation. The same could be said of Herder. 
It was Herder who coined, or, at any rate, popularised, terms such as "national 
language" (Nationalsprache), "national history" (Nationalgeschichte), "national 
education" (Nationalerziehung) or "national traditions" (Nationaltraditionen). 
He never used the expression Volksgeist, however, but Geist des Volkes and 
Geist der Nation as well as Nationalcharakter.2 · 
Taylor says that dignity, authenticity and originality acquire new meaning if 
we take the dialogical viewpoint into account. In other words: that the need for 
recognition appears in a different light if we consider that our life takes place in a 
system of languages (verbal, gestural, artistic, etc.) which is the system of our 
community and which already exists when we enter it, so that, as far as identity 
is concerned, it is always constructed in dialogue with others, with what they 
want to see in us, and often going counter to what others see or. want to see in us. 
2 See Llobera, Josep R. 'I'he God of Modernity. Oxford: Berg, 1994, and Berlin, I. The 
Roots of Romanticism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999. 
102 Nicolas Sanchez Dura 
Therefore, the individualised identity that I am now discovering is the result of a 
negotiation through dialogue, with others outside and inside me.3 
However, insofar as identity depends on an uninterrupted dialogue, a kind of 
negotiation between my interior and the exterior, what I would like to emphasise 
now is that, if there is a failure of recognition, it may damage identity. What 
comes to the foreground, therefore, is no longer the need for recognition, but the 
consideration of the conditions under which the attempt to be recognised may 
fail. 
Taylor indicates two movements with regard to the recognition of identity, 
which are convergent in the universalist supposition, but divergent (and even 
conflictive) in the politics derived from it. On the one hand, the shift from hon-
our to dignity brings universalist politics which emphasise the equal dignity of 
all citizens; they are "difference-blind" politics, because what they aim for is the 
equalisation of rights. On the other hand, there is the emergence of the politics of 
difference. Everyone must be recognised for his particular identity, which is 
unique though subordinate to the cultural com1nunity to which he belongs. 
In the first case, what is recognised is a series of rights for all, leaving aside 
what differentiates citizens, whereas in the second movement what is sought is 
recognition of what makes them different, and this recognition is also made on 
behalf of the ideal of authenticity (in keeping with the characteristic contributed 
by Herder). Or, put more paradoxically, setting aside what is not universal vio-
lates the universalist principle of recognition (which takes the ideal of authentic-
ity as a presumption). 
This gives rise to the politico-cultural question of positive or reverse dis-
crimination: there is a demand for privileged treatment of those cultural groups 
that, historically, have been disfavoured, so that their members may obtain com-
petitive advantages over members of other, historically favoured, cultural com-
munities. However, reverse discrimination may be understood in two ways: as a 
temporary and as a permanent measure. If one understands it as temporary, the 
aim is a levelling of the public sphere, so that, in the future, once inequalities 
have been remedied, it may be possible to apply the universalist politics of rec-
ognition which are difference-blind. Ifit is understood as a permanent policy, the 
aim is to preserve cultural differences for ever, with no return to an undifferenti-
3 For instance, internalized parental figures, even though they may have disappeared 
physically; there is a constant echo of psychoanalysis here, which can also be seen in 
the bibliographical references that appear in his footnotes. 
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ated public space, safeguarding the identity - to which personal identity is as-
sumed to be subsidiary - of "minority'', "minoritised" or "subordinate" cultural 
formations (they have been, and are, described in all these ways and many more 
besides). 
But there is a further aspect, also of extreme importance, which is important 
when considering the politics of recognition of cultural difference. In expound-
ing the modem conception of recognition of the equal dignity of hwnan beings, I 
have said that it could be formulated, in the manner of Kant, by saying that this 
dignity consists in the recognition of a potentiality in which all human beings 
participate: that of being rational agents capable of directing their lives in accor-
dance with principles that reason itself establishes. This is a formal definition of 
dignity, based on characteristics devoid of any substantive content. In fact, the 
politics of recognition actually comprise the equal value of what has, in fact, 
been achieved in accordance with the exercising of that ability. We shall have to 
come back to this point, but we shall do so with reference to the community's 
cultural embodiments of those realisations. 
Thus these two kinds of politics, which share both the ideal of authenticity 
and the concept of equal respect, come into conflict with each other. The former 
kind reproaches the latter for violating the principle of non-discrimination; the 
latter reproaches the former for denying the possibility of an undamaged identity 
when it constrains that which is different, forcing it into a unitary mould (which 
is not neutral from a cultural viewpoint), for difference-blind politics are simply 
the product of a particular culture which is established as dominant. Taylor goes 
on to contrast two models of what he calls "liberal society'', and he clearly sides 
with one of them. Indeed, he says at one point that they are "two incompatible 
views of liberal society" (p. 94). And the view that Taylor defends happens to be 
based on a conception of culture that strikes me as very questionable, as we shall 
see. 
Because of the protection of what Taylor calls the right to survival of a cul-
tural community, he admits that "collective goals may require restrictions on the 
behaviour of individuals that may violate their rights" (p. 91 ). And so he admits 
that, even though individual rights may not have been infringed, "espousing 
collective goals on behalf of a national group can be thought to be inherently 
discriminatory" (ibid.). The reason is clear, for "it will always be the case that 
not all those living as citizens under a certain jurisdiction will belong to the na-
tional group thus favoured". And the example that he puts forward, taken from 
Quebec legislation, is the prohibition that bars the children of French people and 
immigrants from sending their children to an English-speaking school; in other 
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words, French-speaking citizens are compelled to send their children to French-
speaking schools. 
Taylor acknowledges that this goes beyond the policies of bilingualism that 
Canada itself promotes. For, he says, "It is not just a matter of having the French 
language available for those who might choose it[ . .. ] But it also involves mak-
ing sure that there is a community of people here in the future that will want to 
avail itself of the opportunity to use the French language." Or, put more crudely: 
"Policies aimed at survival actively seek to create members of the community 
[ .. . ] in their assuring that future generations continue to identify as French-
speakers. There is no way that these policies could be seen as just providing a 
facility to already existing people" (p. 93).4 That is why attitudes that defend 
policies which seek to "repair breakdowns of equality" (like those of Will Kym-
licka) strike him as inadequate, because they are not designed to "ensure survival 
[of communities] through indefinite future generations" (p. 104, note 17). Con-
sequently, Taylor criticises those who set individual rights above those of cul-
tural communities. As is the case with Dworkin, when he says that a liberal soci-
ety cannot adopt any substantive official conception of what is considered a good 
life, because it would involve a violation of the procedural commitment that 
obliges us to treat each other in an egalitarian, equitable way, irrespective of the 
substantive commitments of each individual, in modem societies that are charac-
terised precisely by their remarkable diversity. 
However, Taylor says that "a society with collective goals like Quebec's vio-
lates this model. It is axiomatic for Quebec governments that the survival and 
flourishing of French culture in Quebec is a good" (p. 93). Note the terminologi-
cal oscillation and consequent ambiguity, which is not at all unimportant. For 
sometimes he speaks of "governments" and sometimes of "society". Yet this is 
not a trifling point, because governments come and go with an instability and 
transience quite different from the variety of beliefs that take root in the citizens 
of a society. Be that as it may, since for Taylor the French-speaking commu-
nity's right to survival indicates two things: on the one hand, that, sometimes, the 
nature of the good that one wishes to preserve needs to be pursued in common, 
and therefore has to become a matter of public policy; and, on the other hand, 
that this does not necessarily imply a lack of respect for those individuals who do 
not share this definition of what is virtuous for life. 
4 My emphasis. 
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Now, Taylor thinks that these two aspects are compatible with the principles 
of a liberal society if one makes a distinction between fundamental rights and 
freedoms on the one hand, and privileges and immunities on the other. What a 
liberal society must do is guarantee fundamental rights (to life, liberty, trial by 
jury, freedom of expression, practice of religion, etc.): thus he distinguishes 
between "the fundamental liberties, those that should never be infringed" and 
"privileges and immunities that are important, but that can be revoked or re-
stricted for reasons of public policy" (p. 93). To avoid violating the liberal 
model, therefore, the safeguarding of one's fundamental rights is sufficient. 
However, I think that this distinction can be highly problematic if one bears in 
mind that, as an example, he supports the measure which prevents immigrants 
and French-speakers from sending their children to English-speaking schools, all 
in order to ensure the future survival of the French-speaking cultural community. 
Taylor's reflection follows on from a very specific case. His reflection is so 
specific that, from section IV onwards, his book proceeds as a case analysis of 
the political situation of Quebec and Canada; and Taylor declared in 1992, when 
the book was published, that Canada was on the brink of "impending break-up" 
as a result of not applying the policy of recognition; a diagnosis that now, fifteen 
years later, we may consider to have been mistaken. But the significant thing is 
not that diagnosis, but the arbitrary reduction that Taylor makes of Canada's 
social and cultural complexity. Because, having surreptitiously made an identifi-
cation between "one language= one culture =one community", the problem is 
posed as if the issue in that state was the recognition of a minority culture by a 
majority culture. But the fact is that Canada - and Quebec - is permeated by a 
wealth of discontinuous economic, social and cultural fracture lines. That is 
precisely the starting point taken by Clifford Geertz when he considers how one 
should think of the political management of cultural diversity as it is configured 
in the world today. 
It is certainly interesting to consider what kind of description precedes 
Geertz's conceptualisation.5 He writes that Canada is an immense territory of 
tens of thousands of square kilometres, stretching from Detroit to the Arctic 
Circle, where French-Canadians abandoned by France after the triumph of the 
British in 1793 have lived alongside loyalists of the British Empire who fled the 
American Revolution, immigrants and fugitives from Europe and the USA and 
the inhabitants of Newfoundland, who, after their economic collapse as an 
5 Geertz, C. Available Light. Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical Topics, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000. 
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autonomous Dominion in 1949, voted by a narrow margin to become a Canadian 
province. Canada has recently received waves of immigrants from the Asian 
Pacific, while a significant number of distinctly different Native American 
groups still survive. Ninety per cent of the population is concentrated into about 
three hundred kilometres of the frontier with the USA; half the population lives 
in the corridor between Toronto and Montreal, and a quarter lives in Quebec, 
where over 80% of the inhabitants are French-speaking. The rest of the popula-
tion lives in the icy north, which is where most of the natural resources are lo-
cated, but the area is so sparsely populated that there is a majority of Native 
American inhabitants in many places, as well as a different kind of French mi-
nority in New Brunswick; Inuit Eskimos in the north-east territories; Ukrainians, 
Asians and even more Native Americans in the west; those of mixed French-
Indian stock, speaking a Creole that is a mixture of French and native languages 
in the forested central part, and a large quantity of English-speakers in New-
foundland. But Algonquin Indians and Inuit, taken together, also constitute the 
majority of the population in almost half the territory claimed by Quebec, and 
there have already been conflicts with these Native American populations con-
cerning the control of natural resources in the soil and subsoil of the Indian terri-
tories. Geertz concludes that Canada as a country is more a field of (culturally 
supposed) "birthplaces", "relationships" or "breeds of people" than something 
that is one in itself, or a problematic coexistence of two opposing cultures, one of 
them lacking recognition. 
Now, leaving aside the possible accuracy of this hasty empirical description 
of Canada, it is undoubtedly a better fit than the one assumed in Taylor's ap-
proach. Because what is crucial here is not Geertz's description in itself, but, as I 
have said, one of Taylor's fundamental conceptual assumptions which this de-
scription brings out in negative fashion: the concept of culture with which he 
works. It appears again when he addresses an issue rather different from cultural 
survival as a desirable substantive commitment of a liberal society. I am refer-
ring to his defence of recognising the "equal value" of different cultures, an issue 
that he considers at the end of his essay and also in "Comparison, History, 
Truth"6• For our purposes, the important thing is not the part that has to do with 
the need for comparison and the logic of intercultural understanding. With regard 
to this question, his point of view ranges from his reference to Gadamer's notion 
of a "fusion of horizons" to positions lying between those of the Wittgen-
steinians (such as Winch) and the Popperians (such as Horton and Jarvie) in the 
6 In: Philosophical Arguments. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995. 
What culture must be recognised in the politics of multiculturalism? 107 
discussions about the relativism of reasons, as in the arguments in the late sixties 
and throughout the seventies and eighties. The important thing, as I have estab-
lished, is the concept of culture that he reveals. 
When Taylor addresses the issue of the equal value of different cultures, he 
warns that he is not referring to "partial cultural milieux within a society" or 
"short phases of a major culture" (which would lead him to the paradox of think-
ing, for instance, that all artistic manifestations of a culture - such as ours - have 
equal value). No, he poses the question of equal value with regard to "all human 
cultures that have animated whole societies over some considerable stretch of 
time" (p. 98). At another point, he says that the cultures he assumes to have 
equal value are "cultures that have provided the horizon of meaning for large 
numbers of human beings, of diverse characters and temperaments, over a long 
period of time - that have, in other words, articulated their sense of the good, the 
holy, the admirable" (p. 101 ). He says of them that one must adopt the "pre-
sumption" that they have a value for all human beings. Now, here Taylor quali-
fies his point of view, for this presumption-which elsewhere he calls a "starting 
hypothesis" or even an "act of faith" - is ex ante. This means that it is not 
equivalent to a statement that all cultures certainly have equal value, but that 
they must not be discarded until one has proceeded to study them (he is referring 
to cultures that are sufficiently distant and different from what, at one point, he 
calls "Western" or even "North Atlantic" culture). The right on which one may 
insist is the ex ante presumption that every traditional culture has a value, but not 
that the study and possible consideration of that value will inevitably conclude 
with the judgement that it is greater than or equal to the value of the others. 
Now, what I want to emphasise is that, in his statements about the need to 
guarantee the survival of cultural communities and in the question of the ex ante 
recognition of the "equal value" of different cultures, Taylor thinks of the notion 
of culture - to put it in Geertz's terms - as a fundamental consensus on good-
ness, beauty and truth; or, if you prefer, as a consensus on conceptions, feelings 
and values: an integral, configurative notion of cultural identity which conceives 
the various cultures as units without fissures, absolutely integrated totalities with 
precise, enduring boundaries, each of them a compact, homogeneous, simple, 
uniform unit. Every people, ethnic group or nation has "its" culture, but also a 
conception of cultural identity in which the individuals belonging to those enti-
ties are totally determined in their actions, with no margin for deviation or break-
ing away from the presumed consensus. What Geertz says is that, if this configu-
rative conception of culture might have some plausibility in the context of the 
ethnology of the classical period (in which the objects of study were small, en-
capsulated, disconnected, illiterate societies - people dwelling in forests, on 
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islands and in deserts), then that concept of culture bas now become crude and 
rudimentary, not serving to capture the cultural particularity and variety that is 
displayed nowadays and that is suggested, for instance, by his description of 
Canada. 
The point is not that cultural diversity bas disappeared, but that it can no 
longer be conceived as a set of windowless cultural monads that coexist along-
side one another in a historically determined political space. In an advanced 
capitalist society, or in "liquid modernity" (to use Zygmunt Bauman's term), 
there are few individuals, if any, who do not pass through more than one com-
munity "of ideas and principles" (as Siegfried Kracauer puts it), 7 communities 
which themselves, incidentally, vary between authentic and imagined, enduring 
and ephemeral. And that, Bauman says, is why the solution of the question of 
sameness (the consistency and continuity of our identity over time) is so bard 
and unstable. Consequently, the question of selfness (i.e., the coherence of what-
ever distinguishes us as persons) is no less problematic, for at any given moment, 
synchronically, we do not belong to just one of those communities.8 But we must 
also bear in mind the logic of personal and group cultural identity. From what 
bas been said, the identity of individuals can be thought of by analogy to a jig-
saw puzzle. However, there is an important difference. Whereas completing a 
jigsaw puzzle is a goal-oriented task (reconstructing a complete final image that 
we know beforehand), in the case of identity, the task is directed towards ends. 
We do not have a final image, but a series of items of very varied historical, 
cultural, social and political provenance with which "we do tests". As Bauman 
says, the problem is not so much one of recovering a community cultural identity 
that is presumed to be original or of making it survive, as of deciding what points 
of arrival are worth reaching. In brief: "We may say that the solving of jigsaw 
puzzles follows the logic of instrumental rationality (selecting the correct means 
to a given end); the construction of identity, on the other hand, is guided by the 
logic of goal rationality (finding out how attractive the ends are that can be 
achieved with the given means)".9 
So we might reconsider some of the viewpoints expressed by Fredrik Barth in 
his famous 1969 book on ethnic groups and boundaries. Especially their cultural 
7 Kracauer, S. The Mass Ornament. Weimar Essays, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1995. 
8 Bauman, Z. Identity. Conversations with Benedetto Vecchi, Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2004,p.13. 
9 Ibid., p. 49. 
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aspect: ceasing to consider groups of people as mere culture-bearing units. Also 
his conception that the cultural differences relevant for assigning individuals to 
collectives are not objective, that they do not depend on a medley of cultural 
features that the observer attributes to one community or another and then de-
cides whether an individual shares them, but that the only relevant differences 
are the ones that the actors consider significant and use polemically and diacriti-
cally in any given time and context, in accordance with their interests, as op-
posed to the others. 10 
Now, this nomadic, contextual logic of the rationality of ends in the construc-
tion or definition of identities brings out an aspect already noted in Geertz's 
description of cultural variety, an aspect that questions the merely culturalistic 
focus of the politics of recognition as conceived by Taylor. For what also forms 
part of Geertz's description is the unequal distribution of economic resources 
among the various populations of Canada, or the conflicts for natural resources 
between Native Americans and French-speakers in Quebec. 11 
Indeed, as Bauman has said, "Identity sprouts on the graveyard of communi-
ties, but flourishes thanks to the promise of a resurrection of the dead". 12 Accord-
ing to him, those defunct communities, the search for whose identity is a "mere 
substitute", are not so much imagined as dreamed; they have always already 
existed, or they will exist in the future, but they are not at all like the ones that 
we really experience. The whole modem process put an end to them. The long-
ing for identity belongs to the nostalgia for a dreamed-of past and the imagining 
of a reconciled future in which we will finally be what we are, or rather, "were", 
because those defunct communities are yearned for like a warm circle: a place 
providing a comfort that is due to the fact that its members are not strangers to 
one another, and to the goodwill shown when help is needed and aid given in 
times of poverty or peril. In short, a place where shared feeling promotes a prior 
understanding that embraces any subsequent disagreement and therefore makes 
its resolution possible. That welcoming warmth, therefore, is not a constructed 
10 See Barth, F., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social Organization of Culture 
Difference, Boston: Little, Brown, 1969, passim. But everything that depends on his 
consideration of small ethnic groups in traditional societies - Pashtun, Ethiopian, etc. 
- cannot be applied here. 
11 I have summarized his description, but as it appears in Geertz's original text it in-
cludes the contradictions between the western provinces and Ontario, which provides 
half the gross domestic product, etc. 
12 Bauman, Z. Community. Seeking Safety in an Insecure World, Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 200 l, p. 16. 
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consensus but something immediately given, tacit, experienced with familiarity 
and not deserving or lacking scrutiny, reflection or experiment. Such a commu-
nity requires clearly determined boundaries; it must be small so that its members 
may be visible to one another; and self-sufficient, so that care and resources are 
available to all. 
But modem societies are, in fact, characterised by an asymmetry in the distri-
bution of care and resources. Moreover, general aspects of citizens' security for 
which the State bad previously assumed responsibility are increasingly being left 
in the hands of the citizens themselves (in the words of Ulrich Beck, cited by 
Bauman, we are all required "to seek biographical solutions to systemic contra-
dictions"). 
Therefore, the urgencies of identity and the consequent demand for recogni-
tion cannot be thought of in isolation from class fractures and considered as a 
merely cultural matter, an aspect that Taylor completely leaves aside. For indi-
viduals with resources, who have all aspects of security guaranteed, the identi-
tarian backing of a stable cultural community is neither necessary nor urgent; 
moreover, it entails a long-term commitment which reduces the freedom of op-
tions that can be permitted. For individuals with scanty resources and all kinds of 
reduced circumstances, it is easy to think that belonging to a community with an 
"objective" basis will guarantee them a security that they are not guaranteed by a 
freedom of choice that they have never had. As Bauman says, citing Jeffrey 
Weeks: "The strongest sense of community is in fact likely to come from those 
groups who :find the premises of their collective existence threatened, and who 
construct out of this a community of identity which provides a strong sense of 
resistance and empowerment. Seeming unable to control the social relations in 
which they find themselves, people shrink the world to the size of their commu-
nities, and act politically on that basis. The result, too often, is an obsessive par-
ticularism as a way of embracing or coping with contingency."13 
But Rorty's opinion - subscribed to and accentuated by Bauman - was that 
this obsessive particularism not only rests on a misunderstanding of the differ-
ence and logic of cultural identity in the contemporary world, but that it is a 
decoy which distracts the dispossessed from their real objectives. For the new 
culturalist left, the main enemy is "a mental structure rather than a structure of 
economic relations"; "talking about money is in bad taste,"14 Rorty says. So that, 
13 Bauman, Z. Community, op. cit., p. 100. 
14 Rorty, R. Achieving Our Country, Harvard University Press, 1998, pp.79 ff. 
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for Bauman, a refusing of real individual material fragilities into the imagined 
power of a community results in "a conservative ideology and exclusivist prag-
matics"15 (a return to imaginary roots; others, collectively, are guilty of what 
happens to us collectively). The consequence is "that the pulverisation of public 
space and its saturation with intercommunal strife is precisely the kind of politi-
cal 'superstructure' (or should we now call it 'substructure'?) that the new power 
hierarchy serviced by the strategy of disengagement needs [ ... ] Global order 
needs a lot oflocal disorder 'to have nothing to fear' ."16 In Identity he goes so far 
as to declare categorically that "the war for social justice has therefore been 
short-changed into a plethora of battles for recognition". 17 
Michael Ignatieff has also underlined the importance of political and eco-
nomic factors in the dynamics of cultural differences, in their creation and possi-
bly violent configuration in communities (ethnic, national, etc.).18 lgnatieff(who 
has also claimed to be a fervent defender of liberalism) reconsiders the concept 
of the "narcissism of minor differences" which Freud coined in The Taboo of 
Virginity (1917). Freud said that "It is precisely the minor differences in people 
who are otherwise alike that form the basis of feelings of strangeness and hostil-
ity between them"; perhaps this is the source of the hostility that fights against 
fraternal feelings in all human relations. However, in that first text, Freud was 
concerned about why male identity depends on converting woman into an object 
not so much of desire as of fear. Freud's answer was: "Perhaps this dread is 
based on the fact that woman is different from man, for ever incomprehensible 
and mysterious, strange and therefore apparently hostile. The man is afraid of 
being weakened by the woman, infected with her femininity and of then showing 
himself incapable." Freud returned to the concept of the "narcissism of minor 
differences" in Group Psychology and Analysis of the Ego (1922), in which he 
went on to consider it in the context of differences of a group nature. What 
caught his attention was the fact that, even in the case of intimate groups -
friendships, marriages, parent-child relationships - the effects are positive and 
negative at the same time, ambivalent. In other words: that which the members 
of the group have in common - as was seen in the case of men and women -
does not always overcome the feeling of hostility. Freud thought that the same 
mechanism, or a similar one, could be observed in societies and between nations. 
15 Bauman, Z. Community, op. cit., p. I 00. 
16 Ibid., p. 105. 
17 Bauman, Z. Identity, op. cit., p. 37. 
18 lgnatieff, M. The Warrior's Honor, Toronto: Viking, 1997. 
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However, Ignatieff says that the degree of hostility, intolerance and even down-
right violence between groups does not have a direct relationship with the mag-
nitude of the cultural, historical and physical differences as perceived by an out-
side observer who is not involved with what is observed. So that the smaller the 
differences appear for that observer, the greater their importance may be for 
those who define themselves from within the confrontation. No cultural differ-
ence matters much until it becomes a privilege and a basis for attempting to 
legitimise oppression. So that "power is the vector that makes small things 
large", and in this dynamic small differences are emphasised and acquire great 
symbolic value. Indeed, violence magnifies minor differences, and in many cases 
the differences become violently aggressive in order to mask the fact that they 
are minor. 
To conclude: the concept of culture that underlies Taylor's theory of multi-
cultural recognition seems to me to be poorly formed and obsolete. Firstly, there 
is its inadvertent (and involuntary) assimilation of language and culture; as Que-
bec is his case analysis, the conclusions that he draws are marred by a desire for 
generality (one of the commonest mistakes of philosophers, according to Witt-
genstein). Secondly, his configurative concept of culture (descended from Her-
der) does not succeed in taking account of cultural plurality and variety as it 
appears in modem societies. The consequence is that, thirdly, his notion of the 
subordination of personal cultural identity to community cultural identity is ex-
cessively rigid and deterministic, so that he does not consider other (political, 
social and economic) determinations as being at all relevant, not only for think-
ing about life in common but even when thinking about cultural differences. 
Taylor upholds a model that he describes as being compatible with liberal-
ism. Ignatieff, for his part, critically defends liberal institutions on the basis of 
the principle that we are first and foremost juridical subjects; first and foremost 
citizens with the same rights and obligations. This entails a historically achieved 
fiction which consists in leaving aside the multitude of differences that can be 
predicated of individuals, while accentuating that common determination: citi-
zens who are subjects with equal rights. In principle, the classical liberal theo-
rists understood "free individuals" to mean wealthy Christian white males. Con-
sequently, the theory was a fiction that excluded women, children, and all non-
white and non-Christian populations. But the liberal fiction has had the historical 
power gradually to incorporate those who, in principle, were excluded (women, 
"the poor'', "blacks", and so on). This has involved long processes of struggle 
and making demands, but what was really being demanded was inclusion in the 
fiction. In other words, the excluded took over the language of liberalism, which 
is universalist, and used it against the original formulations of liberal ideas. The 
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process of integration of the excluded is coupled with the effect of separating the 
individual from the group with which he immediately identifies and being seen 
as conveying rights. So that, ultimately, he has been able to present demands to 
the State, and even to those groups of belonging through which he achieved his 
inclusion. However, all this rests on emphasising the primary role of human 
likeness and not the negation but the secondary nature of differences. 
As for Bauman, who criticises Taylor on this point, following Habermas and 
coming close to Ignatieff in some aspects, he says that, if recognition of cultural 
variety is the right starting point, we must also agree that ''the democratic consti-
tutional state" is the only framework in which it is possible to conduct the debate 
on the human values that must be shared: "Universality of citizenship is the pre-
liminary condition of all meaningful 'politics of recognition'. And, let me add, 
universality of humanity is the horizon by which all politics of recognition, to be 
meaningful, needs to orient itself."19 
Geertz also claims a liberal stance for himself, adding the qualification of 
"social democrat", for he attaches importance to "the equitable distribution of 
life chances", and not just neutrality in matters of personal belief, individualism, 
emphasis on liberty and procedure, or the universality of human rights. But he 
does not want liberalism to consider as pathological, primitive, backward, re-
gressive or irrational what he describes somewhere as "primordial loyalties". 20 
He thinks that liberalism originated in a particular part of the world at a particu-
lar time, that it belongs to a tradition which sets out to be universalist, that it 
embraces a varied experience of how different people can live with a certain 
degree of respect, and that it must engage in discussion with other universalisms 
nurtured in other cultural and historical homes, especially Islam The most that 
can be expected, he declares sceptically, is "a low-intensity peace" and ''the 
moral obligation ofhope".21 
Allow me to introduce a touch of irony: one does not have to go to far-flung, 
exotic places to enjoy variety and difference; one has merely to listen to what 
liberals say. 
19 Bauman, Z. Community, op. cit., p. 140. 
20 Geertz, C. "Primordial Loyalties and Standing Entities". Collegium Budapest/Institute 
for Advanced Study, Public Lectures no. 7, April 1994; also Anthropological Reflec-
tions, op. cit. 
21 Ibid. 
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